Monday, February 6th 2017 –  13:00 – 14:00

Maison des Sciences Économiques, Room 19

 Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris, Métro 5 Campo Formio, bus 57, 67, 27, 83 ou 47

(ThEMA, Université Cergy-Pontoise)
with  M. BAS (CES, Université Paris 1), S. JEAN (CEPII) and G. OREFICE (CEPII)
Does firms’ exposure to export markets affect skilled and unskilled labor volatility?

Abstract – Firms engaged in the global economy affect local labor markets. Little is known, however, about the causal impact of firms’ export exposure on the volatility of employment of different skills. This paper tests simple mechanisms through which firms’ export intensity has a heterogeneous effect on the volatility of skilled and unskilled labor. Under skilled intensive fixed export costs and unskilled intensive variable production, firms exporting more products to more destinations will have a larger volatility of unskilled labor relative to skilled one. Using detailed firm level data from France for the period 1996-2007 and instrumental variable estimations we investigate the causal relationship between firms’ trade exposure and the volatility of employment of different skills. Our findings suggest that firm’exports, driven by exogenous foreign demand shocks, are positively correlated with unskilled labor volatility and negatively correlated with skilled labor volatility.


Monday, January 9th 2017 –  13:00 – 14:00

Maison des Sciences Économiques, Room S19

 Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris, Métro 5 Campo Formio, bus 57, 67, 27, 83 ou 47

Julian HINZ
(Kiel Institute for the World Economy)
with M. CROZET (Chinese University of Hong Kong and CEPII)
Friendly Fire: The Trade Impact of the Russia Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

Abstract – Economic sanctions are a frequent instrument of foreign policy. In a diplomatic conflict, they aim to elicit a change in the policies of foreign governments by damaging their economy. However, sanctions are not costless for the sending economy, where domestic firms involved in business with the target countries might incur economic damages. This paper evaluates these costs in terms of export losses of the diplomatic crisis that started in 2014 between the Russian Federation and 37 countries (including  the United States, the EU, and Japan) over the Ukrainian conflict for the implicated countries. We first gauge the impact of the sanctions’ regime using a structural gravity framework and quantify the trade losses in a general equilibrium counterfactual analysis. We estimate this loss at US$114 billion from 2014 until the end of 2015, with US$ 44 billion being borne by sanctioning Western countries. Interestingly, we find that the bulk of the impact stems from products that are not directly targeted by Russian retaliations (taking the form of an embargo on imports of agricultural products). This result suggests that most of the losses are not attributable to the Russian retaliation but to Western sanctions. We then investigate the underlying mechanism at the firm level using French customs data. Results indicate that neither consumer boycotts nor perceived country risk can account for the decline in exports of products that are not targeted by the Russian embargo. Instead, the disruption of the provision of trade finance services is found to have played an important role.